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I. INTRODUCTION: "WHICH WAY DO YOU JUDGE"?'
J'Noel Gardiner was born a male and subsequently underwent
sex reassignment surgeries and hormone replacement therapy to re-
solve her gender dysphoria (her belief that she was a female in a body
that was anatomically male). 2 Once the surgeries were complete and
J'Noel was, in the words of her surgeon, "a functioning, anatomical
female,"' 3 a Wisconsin court (on J'Noel's petition) ordered the Wis-
consin state registrar to change the name on her birth certificate from
Jay Ball to "J'Noel Ball" and the designation of sex on the birth certif-
icate from male to female. In addition, "her driver's license, passport,
... health documents .... [and] records at two universities [were]
changed to reflect her new sex designation."' 4 Nearly four years after
the surgeries, J'Noel - now living and teaching in Kansas - met and
married Kansas businessman Marshall Gardiner, who died intestate
less than a year later.5 Marshall's son, Joe, petitioned for letters of
administration naming himself as Marshall's sole heir and denying
that J'Noel was Marshall's surviving spouse on the ground that their
marriage violated Kansas' opposite-sex marriage rule.6
On these simple and uncontested facts, the Kansas Supreme
Court in In re Estate of Gardiner7 was faced with the straightforward
issue of whether a post-surgical male-to-female transsexual should be
regarded as male or female for purposes of Kansas' opposite-sex mar-
riage rule.8 Neither simple nor straightforward, however, is the su-
* Associate Professor, Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law. The issue
addressed in this Essay strikes me as Shakespearean in its texture and scope. Gender changes,
family battles, and nothing less than the search for what it means to be human all find resonance
in the work of the Bard. See, e.g., HAROLD BLOOM, SHAKESPEARE: THE INVENTION OF THE
HUMAN 2 (1998) ("What Shakespeare invents are ways of representing human changes, altera-
tions not only caused by flaws and by decay but effected by the will as well."). I therefore offer
no apology, and no further explanation, for the use of Shakespeare's language as benchmarks
throughout this piece, beginning with the title. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE SECOND PART
OF KING HENRY THE SIXTH act 2, sc. 1. I thank Leslie Washington, Class of 2004, for her able
research assistance and my Family Law students for our discussions of these issues.
1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, CORIOLANUS act 2, sc. 3.
2. See In re Estate of Gardiner, 22 P.3d 1086, 1091-92 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001), rev'd, 42 P.3d
120 (Kan. 2002).
3. Id. at 1092.
4. See id.
5. See id. at 1090, 1092.
6. Id. at 1090.
7. 42 P.3d 120.
8. In addition to her argument that she should be regarded as a female under Kansas law
and thus Marshall's surviving spouse, J'Noel argued that the Kansas courts were required to
accord full faith and credit to the amended Wisconsin birth certificate, see Gardiner, 22 P.3d at
1107, but the trial court ruled that it need not give the birth certificate any legal effect in Kansas
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preme court's conclusion that a person's sex is established and fixed at
birth, not at the time of his or her marriage, and that the controlling
factors in determining an individual's sex are anatomical and genetic. 9
This opinion holds a mirror to society's occasional unease over
advances in medical knowledge and techniques that challenge settled
beliefs and accepted legal norms. That unease, and the court's appar-
ent nostalgia for a simpler era, probably had more to do with the out-
come of this case than the legal principles actually invoked by the
court. As a result, the supreme court's opinion is an instructive case
study in the techniques of judicial avoidance and the perpetuation of
medico-legal dissonance.
II. MEDICO-LEGAL DISSONANCE AND JUDICIAL STYLE:
"'TiS DESTINY UNSHUNNABLE, LIKE DEATH" 1 0
The bedrock assumption that underlies the supreme court's entire
opinion is that a person's sex, like death, is fixed in meaning and in
fact, unavoidable and unalterable. It may be useful, therefore, first to
consider briefly recent developments in our medical and legal under-
standings of death as a model for dealing with medico-legal
dissonance.
A. "I know when one is dead"u"
Once upon a time, death was a reasonably straightforward prop-
osition. A person could be either dead or alive, but a person could
not be both dead and alive, or neither dead nor alive. The absence of
respirations and a pulse - unless promptly restored - signaled the de-
mise of the individual.
In response to the development of medical technology that could
sustain breathing (and therefore circulation) indefinitely, this binary
simplicity eventually gave way to a more complex conception of
death. Over time, every state (and the District of Columbia) has ac-
cepted the idea that even a person with a pulse could be dead as long
as all brain functions have irreversibly stopped. 12
and both appellate courts affirmed. See Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 137; 22 P.3d at 1109. Additional
issues (equal protection, fraud, and waiver) addressed by the court of appeals were not before
the supreme court and were not considered.
9. Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 135-36.
10. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO, THE MOOR OF VENICE act 3, sc. 3.
11. For most of human history, few would have quarreled with Lear: "I know when one is
dead, and when one lives; She's dead as earth." WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF
KING LEAR act 5, sc. 3.
12. See ALAN MEISEL, 1 THE RIGHT To DIE 625-27 (2d ed. 1995) (listing all jurisdictions
and their adopting statutes and judicial opinions).
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Despite the universal adoption of "whole brain death" as at least
one criterion for determining when death has occurred, 13 there contin-
ues to be confusion over the concept of death and the application of
that concept in individual cases. It is possible (though unwise) to talk
of a patient who is "medically dead" or "legally dead" as if these were
different states than being "really dead."'1 4 Family members are occa-
sionally asked to consent to the withdrawal of life-sustaining treat-
ment from their brain-dead kin. Whether or not they were asked to
consent, some surrogate decision makers will attempt to refuse con-
sent to the withdrawal of a ventilator. The popular confusion and mis-
trust of this "new way to be dead" is alternately reflected in, and
fueled by, medical thrillers and news reporters who frequently report
that life-support was removed from patients who were declared brain
dead hours or days before.
The confusion stems from more than sloppy thinking or speaking.
"Brain death" is a genuinely challenging concept. Even health care
professionals in the organ-transplantation field have demonstrated a
lack of understanding and acceptance of neurological criteria for the
determination of death.' 5 It is therefore not surprising that at the
same time distinguished ethicists were calling for the adoption of ne-
ocortical death rather than whole-brain death as the basis for deter-
mining when death occurs, 16 two states gave their citizens the right to
opt out of the neurological criteria altogether.1 7 Additionally, the
American Medical Association (AMA) stumbled badly on this issue.' 8
Despite some false starts and occasional detours, however, the
transition from cardiopulmonary criteria to neurological criteria for
determining death is largely complete and mostly successful. Part of
the reason for that success is the congruence that has been achieved
between medical and legal standards. Statutory concepts such as
"medically dead" and "legally dead" have given way to "dead," with-
13. A majority of states have retained the traditional cardiopulmonary criteria for deter-
mining death even after adopting the whole-brain formulation. See id. at 625.
14. See, e.g., Alexandra K. Glazier, "The Brain Dead Patient Was Kept Alive" and Other
Disturbing Misconceptions: A Call for Amendments to the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, 9 KAN.
J.L. & PuB. PoL'y 640, 640-41 (2000) (describing various types of confusion that flow from
"[d]iffering understandings of death, both medico-legal and philosophical, as well as differing
methods for determining whether someone is dead").
15. MEISEL, supra note 12, at 627 (citing Stuart J. Youngner et al., "Brain Death" and Or-
gan Retrieval, 261 JAMA 2205 (1989)).
16. See, e.g., Robert M. Veatch, The Impending Collapse of the Whole-Brain Definition of
Death, 23 HASTINGS CENrER REP., July-Aug. 1993, at 18, 18.
17. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:6A-5 (1996); N.Y. Dep't of Health Regulation, N.Y. CoMp.
CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 400.16(e)(3) (2002).
18. In 1995, the AMA's Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs issued an opinion that
would have allowed anencephalic newborns (born with no functioning cerebral hemispheres but
with some or all of their brain-stem functions intact) to be organ donors even though still alive
pursuant to current criteria for the determination of death. In response to strong criticism from
AMA members themselves, the Council withdrew its opinion almost immediately. See BARRY
R. FURROW ET AL., BIOEmics: HEALTH CARE LAW & ETHiCs 213-17 (4th ed. 2001).
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out modification or qualification. A patient is no longer "considered
dead"; the patient "is dead." The transition came about because of a
partnership of sorts between the medical and legal professions, each
of which brought something of value to the project. The interdepen-
dence of law and medicine in this realm may provide a model for deal-
ing with medicine's future challenges to established legal concepts.
Perhaps sexual identity will be next.
B. "The error of our eye directs our mind"'19
Like death, the concept of sexual identity has undergone a scien-
tific and social transformation, with emerging medical understandings
challenging long-held and familiar beliefs about the criteria by which
society should establish an individual's sex. 20 As the court of appeals'
opinion in Gardiner recognized, the determination of an individual's
sex is a multifactorial process. Relying principally upon Professor Ju-
lie Greenberg's path-breaking article,21 the court recited eight criteria
that determine sex:
1. Genetic or chromosomal sex - XY or XX;
2. Gonadal sex (reproductive sex glands) - testes or ovaries;
3. Internal morphologic sex (determined after three months gesta-
tion) - seminal vesicles/prostrate [sic] or vagina/uterus/fallopian
tubes;
4. External morphologic sex (genitalia) - penis/scrotum or clitoris/
labia;
5. Hormonal sex - androgens or estrogens;
6. Phenotypic sex (secondary sexual features) - facial and chest hair
or breasts;
7. Assigned sex and gender of rearing; and
8. Sexual identity. 22
The most observable of these indicia - genitalia and secondary
sexual characteristics - thus are only two of many factors that are rele-
vant to the determination of sex. As the most observable, however,
they may also be the most misleading. As Professor Greenberg
observed:
For most people, these [eight] factors are all congruent, and
one's status as a man or woman is uncontroversial. For intersexuals,
some of these factors may be incongruent, or an ambiguity within a
factor may exist.
The assumption is that there are two separate roads, one lead-
ing from XY chromosomes at conception to manhood, the other
19. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, TROILUS AND CRESSIDA act 5, sc. 2.
20. Professor Laqueur has argued that shifts in social and political attitudes actually pre-
ceded eighteenth century science's "discovery" of the sexes. See THOMAS LAQUEUR, MAKING
SEX: BODY AND GENDER FROM THE GREEKS TO FREUD 149-63 (1990).
21. Julie A. Greenburg, Defining Male and Female: Intersexuality and the Collision Between
Law and Biology, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 265 (1999).
22. See In re Estate of Gardiner, 22 P.3d 1086, 1094 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001) (quoting Green-
berg, supra note 21, at 278) (alteration in original).
[Vol. 42
Sex, Marriage, Medicine, and Law
from XX chromosomes at conception to womanhood. The fact is
that there are not two roads, but one road with a number of forks
that turn in the male or female direction. Most of us turn in the
same direction at each fork. 23
Intersexual conditions, which result from an errant fork somewhere in
the process of sexual differentiation, range across a spectrum of truly
impressive variation. As Professor Greenberg describes them, the
variations are of two basic types: ambiguity within one of the eight
factors that contribute to an individual's sex 24 and ambiguity among
the factors.25 The court of appeals' opinion included a detailed review
of the various intersexed conditions, concluding with Professor Green-
berg's observation that various studies and reports of intersexuality
have forced the medical and psychiatric communities to question
their long-held beliefs about sex and sexual identity. Just as current
scientific studies have caused the scientific communities to question
their beliefs about sex and sexual identity, the legal community
must question its long-held assumptions about the legal definitions
of sex, gender, male, and female.2 6
Whether one agrees or disagrees with the court of appeals' conclusion,
it rose to the challenge and confronted the dissonances created by sci-
entific developments and traditional legal norms. By contrast, the su-
preme court's opinion in Gardiner shows a court in full retreat from
scientific learning. As such, the opinion is a model of how not to deal
with medico-legal issues when old legal paradigms are challenged by
new scientific learning.
C. "What means this silence?"27
The most direct way to deal with the medico-legal dissonances
created by science is to ignore the science. Thus, in contrast to the
detailed technical discussion of intersexuality in the court of appeals'
opinion, the supreme court consulted a medical dictionary for a defini-
tion of "transsexual, '2 8 but largely ignored the medical and psychiatric
understandings of gender dysphoria. The court sampled judicial dis-
cussions of intersexuality, noting some with approval and distinguish-
ing or dismissing others, but the exercise was essentially nonfactual,
23. Id. at 1094 (quoting Greenberg, supra note 21, at 278-79).
24. Single-factor ambiguities include chromosomal ambiguity (variation from the tradi-
tional XX and XY patterns); gonadal ambiguity; incongruous or ambiguous external morphol-
ogy, internal morphology, hormonal sex, and phenotypic sex; disjunctions between the sex
assigned at birth and the gender by which the individual is raised; and sexual identity. See id. at
1095 (quoting Greenberg, supra note 21, at 281-82).
25. Multi-factor ambiguities occur when some factors are clearly male and others are clearly
female. "Incongruity among factors can result from a number of disorders and circumstances
including: a. Chromosomal sex disorders; b. Gonadal sex disorders; c. Internal organ anomalies;
d. External organ anomalies; e. Hormonal disorders; f. Gender identity disorders; and g. Surgical
creation of an intersexed condition." See id. at 1096 (quoting Greenberg, supra note 21, at 283).
26. Id. at 1100 (quoting Greenberg, supra note 21, at 282).
27. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE FIRST PART OF KING HENRY THE SIXTH act 2, sc. 4.
28. See In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120 (2002).
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lining up of nonbinding precedents and rationales without coming to
grips with the fact that the familiar meaning of "sex" is under chal-
lenge by scientific and medical progress.
If the central issue in a case was whether a person were dead or
alive at a relevant moment in time, it would be intolerable to maintain
separate criteria for "medical death" and "legal death" and to decide
the issue of death according to the latter rather than the former.
Clinical physicians, pathologists, hospital administrators, emergency
medical technicians, the police, prosecutors, clergy, funeral directors,
and life insurance companies - not to mention family members and
patients themselves - all have their own reasons to want an answer to
the question and are ill-served by inconsistent answers from different
authorities, legal and medical.
Similarly, as the case law in this field amply illustrates, there are
many reasons to determine a person's sex, and the answer
can... have a wide variety of collateral consequences. It may affect
or determine, for example, the validity of a marriage [and therefore
such issues of bigamy, right to maintenance and support, and ability
to inherit or to maintain a wrongful death action as a surviving
spouse], whether a birth certificate may be amended, entitlement to
pension or insurance rights that distinguish by gender, whether dis-
tinctions in employment are, as to a particular individual, permissi-
ble or unlawful, application of the law of rape or other offenses in
which gender may be an element or issue, medical treatment and
housing assignment upon incarceration or other institutional con-
finement, entitlement to participate in certain amateur or profes-
sional sports, . . . housing and work assignments available for
persons in military service [and] various estate and trust issues,...
for example, whether a male to female transsexual would still qual-
ify for a legacy to the testator's "son." 29
By turning a blind eye to the emerging medical understanding of in-
tersexuality, the supreme court missed an opportunity to move the law
in a humane direction that takes better account of human experience
than the binary-at-birth notion of sex we have inherited from earlier
times.
D. "Wrest once the law to your authority"30
As previously noted, the supreme court resolved the issue in Gar-
diner by stacking up precedents from other jurisdictions and choosing
legal interpretations that made the most sense to the court. This is
entirely consistent with another of the court's fundamental disagree-
ments with the court of appeals.
29. In re Heilig, 816 A.2d 68, 85 n.9 (Md. 2003) (citations omitted).
30. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE act 4, sc. 1.
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When the lower court remanded the case to the trial court, it pro-
vided the following instructions:
We conclude that a trial court must consider and decide whether an
individual was male or female at the time the individual's marriage
license was issued and the individual was married, not simply what
the individual's chromosomes were or were not at the moment of
birth.
The court may use chromosome makeup as one factor, but not
the exclusive factor, in arriving at a decision.
Aside from chromosomes, we adopt the criteria set forth by
Professor Greenberg. On remand, the trial court is directed to con-
sider [Professor Greenberg's] factors in addition to chromosome
makeup .... The listed criteria we adopt as significant in resolving
the case before us should not preclude the consideration of other
criteria as science advances. 3'
Based upon these instructions, the supreme court concluded that the
court of appeals had erroneously treated the question of J'Noel's sex
as raising questions of fact that needed to be resolved after a hearing.
In the supreme court's view, however, the issue in Gardiner raised a
question of pure law: When the Kansas legislature provided that
"[t]he marriage contract is to be considered in law as a civil contract
between two parties who are of opposite sex,"'32 what did it mean by
the words "sex," "male," and "female"? 33
One reading of the supreme court's opinion is that once the court
decided the legal issue in this case, there were no disputed factual is-
sues left to decide. That is, because the legislature's use of the words
"sex," "male," and "female" excludes transsexuals and refers solely to
an individual's genetic sex and genitalia at birth,34 there was no need
for a hearing to settle that issue of fact because the record amply sup-
ported the fact that J'Noel was born with male chromosomes and
genitalia.
In the same paragraph, however, the supreme court made this
somewhat broader assertion:
We disagree with the decision reached by the Court of Appeals. We
view the issue in this appeal to be one of law and not fact. The
resolution of this issue involves the interpretation of K.S.A. 2001
Supp. 23-101. The interpretation of a statute is a question of law,
and this court has unlimited appellate review. 35
Along the same line, the supreme court had earlier written that "the
essential difference between the line of cases.., that would invalidate
31. Gardiner, 22 P.3d at 1110.
32. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-101 (1995 & Supp. 2001).
33. See Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 135.
34. See id. On its face, this is a puzzling statement. If transsexuals are neither male nor
female and have no sex for purposes of Kansas' opposite-sex rule, does that mean J'Noel may
not lawfully marry a woman or a man? The court concluded it does not: "J'Noel remains a
transsexual, and a male for purposes of marriage." Id. at 137.
35. Id. at 135.
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the Gardiner marriage[,] and the line of cases ... that would validate
it[,] is that the former treats a person's sex as matter of law and the
latter treats a person's sex as a matter of fact."'36 This is the language
appellate courts use to take issues away from juries and assign them to
trial judges in the first instance. Then, once an issue is described as
"legal" and is wrested from the jury, appellate judges can control the
development of the law around that issue through de novo review. In
Gardiner, however, the supreme court seems to have had a different
purpose in mind: to wrest the statutory-interpretation issue from the
realm of science and medicine and maintain judicial hegemony over
the issue of determining an individual's sex. Thus, the supreme court
quoted approvingly from a Seventh Circuit opinion in which that
court rejected the assertion that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act pro-
tects transsexuals from discrimination in the workplace: "We do not
believe that the interpretation of the word 'sex' as used in the statute
is a mere matter of expert medical testimony or the credibility of wit-
nesses produced in court."'37 Of course, the debate over whether an
issue is a question of law or question of fact does not need to be
framed or resolved in terms of "control," and the use of expert wit-
nesses (subject to appropriate judicial control) is not incompatible
with the court's ultimate obligation to decide questions of law.
There is also a certain circularity in the supreme court's logic at
this point. Why is the question of J'Noel's sex a question of law? Be-
cause there is nothing for the jury to decide. And why is there nothing
for the jury to decide? Because J'Noel's sex was immutably fixed at
birth and could not be changed through surgery and hormone ther-
apy.38 On that basis, then, the court concluded that it had the power
and duty to decide J'Noel's sex as a matter of law and came to the
altogether unsurprising conclusion, in light of its premises, that
J'Noel's sex was fixed at birth and could not be changed through sur-
gery or hormone therapy.
E. "[Uinderstand a plain man in his plain meaning"39
The supreme court further insulated its decision from scientific
and medical reality by concluding that "sex," "male," and "female"
are "[w]ords in common usage [that] are to be given their natural and
36. Id. at 132-33.
37. Id. at 136 (quoting Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1086 (7th Cir. 1984)).
38. Id. at 133. The language in the text is a close paraphrase of language the supreme court
quoted, seemingly with approval, from Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. App. 1999):
"[Clan a physician change the gender of a person with a scalpel, drugs and counseling, or is a
person's gender immutably fixed by our Creator at birth? . . . [O]nce a man, always a man. ...
There are some things we cannot will into being. They just are." Id. at 224, 227, 231.
39. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE act 3, sc. 5.
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ordinary meaning. ' 40 This is a perfectly serviceable canon of statutory
construction, but like all canons it should be treated as a rule of
thumb, not an inflexible rule. In particular, its invocation in Gardiner
assumes the answer to the very question the court had to decide:
whether the "ordinary meanings" of the words "sex," "male," and "fe-
male" have changed or should be altered to reflect new understand-
ings of the terms in light of medical progress.
The weakness in the supreme court's approach is revealed by its
attempt to discern the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory
terms. The court recited definitions from a dictionary published in
1970 that reiterates the binary idea of sex as either male or female -
which is entirely consistent with J'Noel's claim that as a post-surgical
transsexual she is a female, not some third sex outside the dictionary
definition - and did not address the question of immutability at all.41
The court noted that Kansas' marriage statute does not mention
intersexed conditions and the legislative history is silent about them as
well. From this silence, the court inferred that the legislature intended
to exclude post-surgical transsexuals from the marriage statute. 42 The
supreme court's reasoning here is subject to at least two criticisms.
First, if the legislature believed, either at the time it enacted its mar-
riage statute or today, that post-surgical transsexuals are male or fe-
male by virtue of the reconciliation of sex factors, there would be no
need to provide separately for transsexuals in the law. Thus, legisla-
tive silence in this case could logically be interpreted to mean that
there is no gap in the statute and post-surgical transsexuals are cov-
ered. If a canon is needed to support this conclusion, this one would
do nicely: "Statutes framed in general terms apply to new cases that
arise . .. and which come within their general scope and policy.
[L]egislative enactments in general and comprehensive terms, pro-
spective in operation, apply alike to all persons ... within their gen-
eral purview and scope."'43 Viewed in this manner, giving legal status
to J'Noel's sex change would even be supported by the court's own
"plain meaning" canon.
Second, courts are asked to fill gaps in statutes all the time.
When they demur, they will say (as the supreme court did in Gar-
diner44) that it is not their job to make law, only to enforce the law as
the legislature has enacted it. When courts accept the invitation to fill
40. The court concluded, "The plain, ordinary meaning of 'persons of the opposite sex'
contemplates a biological man and a biological woman and not persons who are experiencing
gender dysphoria." Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 135.
41. See id.
42. See id. at 136 ("We view the legislative silence to indicate that transsexuals are not
included.").
43. Commonwealth v. Maxwell, 114 A. 825, 829 (Pa. 1921).
44. See Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 135-36.
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a statutory gap, it is usually to bring the language of the law into con-
formity with what the legislature apparently intended, or would have
intended if they had thought of the problem in the first place. For
most courts, therefore, the difficult question is not whether they
should ever accept the invitation to fill a statutory gap, but when to
accept the invitation and when to decline it.
Obvious sources of guidance for such decisions are social norms
and understandings. Social norms and understandings draw on all
kinds of knowledge and experience, including medical and scientific,
but the supreme court blocked those sources of information by declar-
ing the issue in Gardiner to be one of law and therefore not suscepti-
ble to expert "control." Failure to consider seriously the medical and
scientific understandings of sex, in turn, blinded the court to other
sources of social norms and understandings, leaving the court with lit-
tle upon which to base its judgment other than its own preconceptions
and sexual stereotypes.45
F. "[T]he lottery of my destiny [b]ars me the right of
voluntary choosing"'46
Both the Kansas Supreme Court's opinion in Gardiner and the
Texas Court of Appeals' opinion in Littleton v. Prange,47 upon which
the supreme court so heavily relies, conclude that sex is genetic, fixed
at birth, and immutable. This conclusion seems to embrace a version
of genetic determinism that might have been difficult to sustain had
the court been open to evolving medical (and social) understandings
of sex.
Stephen Jay Gould once offered a description of what genetic de-
terminists believe: "If we are programmed to be what we are, then
these traits are ineluctable. We may, at best, channel them, but we
45. It is worth noting the variety and number of sources of meaning that are missing from
the court's opinion. There is no mention of § 21(d) of the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Service's MODEL STATE VITAL STATISTICS ACT & REGULATIONS (1992 rev.) ("Upon
receipt of a certified copy of an order of (a court of competent jurisdiction) indicating the sex of
an individual born in this State has been changed by surgical procedure and whether such indi-
vidual's name has been changed, the certificate of birth of such individual shall be amended as
prescribed by regulation."), or of the twenty-two states (and the District of Columbia) that have
enacted this provision or one very much like it. See In re Heilig, 816 A.2d 68, 83-84 (Md. 2003).
The Heilig opinion describes other legal developments, as well, in the United States and else-
where, that receive little or no attention in the supreme court's opinion in Gardiner. These
include the Social Security Administration's willingness to change their records after sex-change
surgery, the Bureau of Prison's practice of housing post-surgical transsexuals with inmates of
their acquired gender, and the State Department's reported practice of altering the designation
of sex on the passports of post-surgical transsexuals. See id. at 86.
46. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE act 2, sc. 1. It is important to be
clear about the concept of "choice" in the context of sexual identity. There is virtually no sense
in which a transsexual "chooses" to be male or female, other than when an individual chooses
surgery or hormone therapy to achieve greater coherence and consistency among the factors that
determine sex.
47. 9 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. App. 1999).
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cannot change them either by will, education, or culture. '48 On this
view, at the moment of conception the genetic lottery determines all -
eye color, internal and external anatomy, and sex itself - and it is the
genetic lottery that fixes the individual's sexual destiny at conception.
Both courts certainly viewed the concepts of "male," "female," and
"sex" as having a genetic basis, but what of the fact that there is prob-
ably a genetic basis for most intersexual conditions, as well? Logi-
cally, if genetics is the sole basis for the determination of sex, it should
not be ignored when the lottery produces gender dysphoria. Put oth-
erwise, genetics alone cannot explain why genetics is irrelevant when
the person whose sex is in question is a transsexual. The explanation
may be a "normality bias in legal decision making, '49 or it may be
something else, including religious bias,50 but it is not genetics, which
is all the Gardiner and Littleton courts offered to justify their rulings.
Finally, genetic determinism does not explain why characteristics that
have genetic origins cannot be changed through non-genetic altera-
tion, nor does it explain why those alterations should be ignored.
III. CONCLUSION: "I HOPE IT IS NO DISHONEST DESIRE TO DESIRE
TO BE A WOMAN OF THE WORLD"
'5 1
One of the ironies of the Kansas Supreme Court's decision in
Gardiner is that it sought a result that would promote the legislative
policy favoring opposite-sex marriages. 52 In fact, the decision may un-
dermine that policy more than if the court had recognized J'Noel Gar-
diner as female. For example, a year after the Texas court's decision
in Littleton, a lesbian couple was married in Bexar County, a result
that could only have occurred after Littleton settled the question of
sex in Texas and led to the conclusion that one of the couple - a male-
to-female transsexual - was genetically male and therefore a member
of the opposite sex. 53
Is this an example of the law of unintended consequences? It
would appear so. But it is that law, not the law that limits marriage to
opposite-sex couples, to which the supreme court might have been
more attentive. The best protection against errant legal doctrines and
48. See Daniel C. Dennett, The Mythical Threat of Genetic Determinism, CHRON. HIGHER
EDUC., Jan. 31, 2003, at B7.
49. See Robert A. Prentice & Jonathan J. Koehler, A Normality Bias in Legal Decision
Making, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 583, 583 (2003). The authors posit that jurors and judges alike
have a deep-rooted preference for the familiar and the "normal," and that this preference plays
out in their legal decision making, including an "aversion to what is unusual." Id. at 638-40.
50. Cf. Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 224 (phrasing the legal question as whether "a person's gender
[is] immutably fixed by our Creator at birth").
51. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, As You LIKE IT act 5, sc. 3.
52. See In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120, 136 (2002).
53. See Adolfo Pesquera, Lesbian Couple Get License to Wed: Transsexual Ruling Clears
the Way, SAN ANTONIO EXPREss-NEws, Sept. 7, 2000, at lB.
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untoward outcomes is a judicial mind-set that is open to sources of
information outside the law itself. Social norms and understandings,
after all, are shaped by experiences and information of all kinds, and a
legal system that insists on an insular approach to complex social phe-
nomena risks irrelevance or worse - a system of rules that is at war
with the experiences and understandings of society.
